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INTRODUCTION
The Advanced Fighter Technology Integration (AFTI)/F-16
Program is a technology development effort managed by the
Advanced Development Program Office (ADPO), Flight Dynamics
Laboratory (FDL), Air Force Wright Aeronautical Laboratories
(AFWAL), Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. The overall objectives
of this joint Air Force, NASA, Navy, and General Dynamics
Corp. program are to develop and demonstrate technologies
and alternatives for future fighter aircraft design. These
objectives are to be accomplished in several phases. This
paper addresses the results of the first phase - the digital
flight control system (DFCS).
The digital flight control system phase consisted of the
development and flight testing of a triplex, asynchronous,
multimode, digital flight control system which was inte-
grated with improved avionics. Flight testing was conducted
by the AFTI/F-16 Joint Test Force from the Dryden Flight
Research Facility at Edwards AFB, California, from July 10,
1982, through July 30, 1983. A total of 118 flight test
sorties were flown, totaling 177.2 flight hours.
This paper summarizes the flight test program and
addresses several design issues of general interest. The
paper begins with a brief description of the test vehicle,
its flight control modes, and the flight envelopes in which
testing was accomplished. It further summarizes flight test
results by addressing benefits experienced in flight control
task-tailoring, handling qualities in mission tasks, air-
craft structure considerations, digital flight control sys-
tem performance, and human factors. The last section
addresses several design issues relevant to future fighter
aircraft.
THE T~ST AIRCRAFT
The AFTI/F-16 is a modified full-scale development
~~F-16A aircraft. Modifications included incorporation of an
asynchronous operation, triplex digital flight control sys-
tem, which provided multiple in-flight-selectable flight
contrJl laws, including six-degree-of-freedom decoupled air-
craft motions. Twin canards were mounted from actuators in
each side of the lower lip of the engine inlet, 15° off the
vertical. A fuselage dorsal fairing was added to provide
room for test instrumentation and additional avionics. New
and modified cockpit controls and displays included a rede-
signed sidestick controller incorporating eight switches, a
linear motion throttle with a twist action controller for
vertical decoupled motion, a conventional optics wide-field-
of-view head-up display, two multipurpose display cathode
ray tubes, and a voice command system providing voice actua-
tion of selected cockpit switches.
Eight distinct cockpit-selectable control laws were
implemented with the digital flight control system. Each
set of control laws (control modes) was "task-tailored" for
the intended mission. Decoupled control motions were
included with selected control modes, as shown in table 1.
Each of the decoupled-mode pitch axes was implemented
with a "maneuver enhancement" version of the corresponding
standard-mode pitch-axis command mechanization. Maneuver
enhancement was accomplished by tailoring symmetrical flap-
eron and horizontal tail motions to achieve the desired
pitch response. Trailing-edge flaperon motion was designed
to minimize steady-state drag at a given flight condition
(scheduled flaps), while simultaneously quickening g res-
ponse or improving tracking (maneuvering flaps). Maneuvering
flaps were optimized for either flightpath maneuver enhance-
ment (FPME) or pitch-rate maneuver enhancement (PRME).
The pitch axis of the decoupled air-to-air mode was a
unique mechanization of variable gains. Pitch command gains
varied as a function of the pitch-rate error signal (comman-
ded versus actual). For large changes in pitch command,
command gains were increased to improve pitch-rate and load-
factor response. Desirable fine-tracking handling qualities
were to be achieved with lower command gains for smaller
pitch command changes.
Six-degree-of-freedom decoupled motions were produced by
combined deflections of two similarly oriented control sur-
faces (fig. 1). In the vertical axis, combined deflections
of flaperons and horizontal tails were used with different
control laws to produce decoupled direct lift, pitch point-
ing, or vertical translation (fig. 2). Vertical decoupled
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motions were controlled using the throttle twist controller.
Combined deflections of vertical canards and rudder were
used with different control laws to produce the directional
decoupled motions of direct sideforce (flat turn), yaw
pointing, and lateral translation (fig. 3). Rolling moments
produced by directional control surface deflections were
countered by roll control surfaces to provide directional
decoupling. Directional decoupled motions were controlled
on the conventional rudder pedals.
Figures 4 and 5 show the final flight envelopes achieved
for handling qualities evaluations. During preliminary
evaluations, it was determined that, except for the standard
normal control mode, the decoupled control modes showed more
potential for improved mission performance. Envelope expan-
sions of the standard modes for bombs, air-to-air guns, and
air-to-surface guns were discontinued at that time.
Although there was often more than one set of control laws
implemented and evaluated in the AFTI/F-16 for each mission
task, only the results of the "best" control laws evaluated
are reported in this paper.
FLIGHT TEST RESULTS
Task. Tailoring
The effort to optimize control laws for individual mis-
sion tasks was highly successful. Using the production F-16
aircraft as a baseline for comparison, pilots cited marked
improvements in handling qualities for nearly all tasks.
These tasks included air-to-air and air-to-ground missions,
as well as formation flying and approach and landing. It
was apparent that the control laws had been developed with
accurate prioritization of the control parameters used for
individual mission tasks.
In the process of identifying the "best" control laws
for each task, it became clear that control law optimization
for one task did not carryover to another task. During
preliminary evaluations, several control laws were investi-
gated for potential utility. Many control laws were eval-
uated intentionally for tasks for which they were not
designed. In every case, the task-tailored control law was
identified as having superior handling qualities for that
task. In many cases, the converse was also true. Task-
tailored control laws often demonstrated unacceptable
handling qualities in tasks for which they were not
tailored.
The full benefits of task tailoring could not have been
realized without multiple control modes. Handling qualities
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improvements over the production F-16 aircraft in nearly all
tasks indicated that significant benefits are to be gaine<1
in the task-tailoring approach. Handling qualities improve-
ments were, however, associated with distinct ~C)ntrol modes,
and each of these control modes demonstrated less desirable
handling qualities in tasks for which they were not tail-
ored. This indicated that a single control mode could not
have been tailored for multiple missions without compromis-
ing handling qualities for some or all of the mission tasks.
Air-to-Air Handling Qualities
The decoupled air-to-air flight control mode employed
pitch-rate maneuver enhancement tailored to facilitate air-
to-air weapon delivery. The mode exhibited superior nose-
pointing capability, reliable predictability, and precise
small-amplitude high-frequency control. Although the con-
cept of weighting feedback variables, such as load factor
and pitch rate, was not new, it appeared to offer consistent
improvement over simpler control law structures. The basic
control law concept employed in the air-to-air task-tailored
control law suggested generic structure which should be
observed by any fighter.
The differential weighting of pitch rate as a function
of pitch-rate error attempted to address the requirement of
large tracking errors for immediate movement of the flight-
path vector, which requires significant overshoot of pitch
rate. Small errors, hnwever, necessitate high-frequency
attitude adjustments and are more closely controlled with
minimum pitch-rate overshoot. The AFTI/F-16 air-to-air
control law attempted to infer which type of tracking error
existed by categorizing feedback pitch-rate error. Regard-
less of the variable used to deduce the magnitude of the
tracking error, the capability to switch between the two
pitch-rate responses suggested that the AFTI/F-16 aircraft
is a paradigm for any fighter when judged from the flying
qualities point of view.
The decoupled capabilities of pitch and yaw pointing did
not demonstrate the same unequivocal utility as the longitu-
dinal coupled control law. Although difficult to ascertain
when pitch-pointing authority was saturated, the mode
appeared quite controllable in terms of response rise time,
linear movement and small overshoot of final position. Con-
trollability notwithstanding, target tracking handling qual-
ities were not improved over sole use of coupled longitudi-
nal control on the conventional sidestick. For small cor-
rections, yaw pointing permitted better azimuth error
correction than lateral stick only. Limited pointing and
yaw-rate authorities restricted its use for larger correc-
tions and higher line-of-sight-rate targets typical of
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high-aspect gunnery (table 2). Pedal forces were rather
high for a vernier controller. Bank attitude became harder
to c0ntrol with larger yaw-pointing angles. It was occa-
sionally difficult to avoid overcontrol in the lateral axis,
expecially for small, quick inputs with large aft stick
inputs. Yaw pointing appeared to obviate this lateral ~if­
ficulty and represented its chief advantage.
Air-to-Ground Handling Qualities
Flightpath maneuver enhancement was incorporated in the
decoupled bombs control mode to improve precision in flight-
path control and alleviate gust upset. An additional fea-
ture of automatic trim compensation relieved the pilot from
having to make trim corrections for pitch-attitude changes
(dive angle) and for airspeed changes (zero speed stabil-
ity). The result was excellent air-to-ground and strafe
pipper stability, precise control, and improved ride qual-
ity. All combined to reduce pilot workload and improve
mission performance.
The primary decoupled motions evaluated for the air-to-
ground tasks were flat turn and direct lift. Although
smooth and precise air-to-ground tracking corrections could
be made using direct lift on the throttle twist controller,
the same task could be accolnplished equally well using only
coupled longitudinal control on the conventional sidestick.
The use of flat turn in the bombing and strafing tasks pro-
vided the significant advantage of reducing the directional
correction problem from two control axes to one. Conven-
tional control requires use of the roll and pitch axis to
make directional corrections. Often the dynamics of bomb
fall lines, pendulum effects, and/or gravity drop (strafe
pippers) cause unpredictability in pipper motion while mak-
ing corrections using the roll axis. Flat turn eliminated
that unpredictability by allowing corrections to be made
using a direct pipper tracking path to the target. The
result was a quicker and more accurate weapon solution.
Handling Qualities in Formation
The standard normal mode was intended for use in naviga-
tion and formation flying tasks. Handling qualities were
satisfactory for small pitch inputs generally representative
of aerial refueling and mild maneuvering in close formation.
Pilots preferred the aerial refueling handling qualities of
the AFTI/F-16 aircraft over the production F-16 aircraft,
primarily because of a perceived improvement in open-loop
pitch stability. For larger pitch inputs, however, a some-
what unpredictable response ".;as discovered which the pilots
described as a vertical "heaving."
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This description of aircraft motion suggests that the
blended motion of trailing-edge flaps in this mode may have
been responsible for the undesirable response. In close
formation, relative change in pitch attitude may be a more
precise pilot cue for position control than load factor.
The use of maneuvering flaps to increase weighting of load
factor in pitch response may lead to unpredictability in
for~ation flying.
Translations were primarily evaluated for close-
formation and aerial refueling tasks. The mechanization of
lateral and vertical translation gave the pilot acceler.ation
controllers and was found to be peculiar. With any input,
the pilot was commanding an acceleration and, when released,
a deceleration. Mechanization with translation rate control
would have been more intuitive. The control surface deflec-
tion for vertical translation produced considerable drag,
which complicated the fore and aft positioning task. The
vertical positioning task was more easily accomplished using
coupled longitudinal control on the conventional sidestick.
It was projected that, with a rate controller, lateral
translation could offer benefits in the aerial refueling
task.
Approach and Landing Handling Qualities
Handling qualities of the AFTI/F-l6 aircraft during
approach and landing were significantly better than those of
the production F-l6 aircraft. The pitch-rate command system
provided precise pitch-attitude control with exceptional
hands-off pitch stability. With reduced workload in pitch-
attitude control, pilots perceived correlated improvements
in flightpath and angle-of-attack stability. The overall
result was improved aircraft control and landing perfor-
mance.
These improvements were apparent for both front-side and
back-side control techniques. When flying the front-side
technique, for which flightpath was the primary control
parameter, precise pitch attitude control reduced effort
spent in establishing and maintaining flight path leaving
more time for control of airspeed and angle-of-attack using
the throttle. Using the back-side technique, for which
angle-of-attack was the primary control parameter, pitch
attitude stability tended to reduce angle-of-attack varia-
~ion allowi~g more time for control of flight path control
using power. The Navy project pilot conducted a comparative
evaluation of carrier approach handling qualities between
the AFTI/F-16 and the production F-16 aircraft. From this
high gain back-side technique evaluation, he concluded that
the AFTI/F-16 demonstrated better handling qualities.
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Degraded i10des
~n analog independent backup unit flight control system
was incorporated in the AFTI/F-16 aircraft to offer a safe
recovery capability in the event of generic digital flight
control system failures. Although the backup unit was
tested throughout the Mach-altitude envelope of the rligital
flight control system, testing was limited to benign maneu-
vering. No high-angle-of-attack testing or landings were
accomplished in the backup mode. The independent backup unit
performed as it was designed, and flight test results
matched well with simulation. The only significant discre-
pancy was a tendency for lateral-directional pilot-induced
oscillation at Mach 1.2 and 30,000 ft.
The AFTI/F-16 digital flight control system architecture
included control law reconfigurations for complete loss of
certain types of sensor information. These seven recon-
figuration control laws were not tested in flight.
Structures
Flight testing demonstrated the advantages of digita~
flight control systems for exploiting aircraft structure
envelopes. Without expensive or complicated analog or mech-
anical systems, the flight control law gain structure essen-
tially "mapped" the structural capability of the aircraft by
limiting surface motions as a function of flight condition.
Performance was improved by taking advant~ge of that struc-
tural capability over a large portion of the flight enve-
lope. This did, however, significantly increase the flight
test matrix since there was no one "worst case" flight con-
dition below which structural loads could be assumed accep-
table. Where flight test loads did not match predicted
loads, changes could be made in software (instead of making
expensive hardware changes) to improve structural "mapping."
The predictions for structural loads during unique
decoupled motions were inadequate. Decoupled maneuvers pro-
duced horizontal tail loads and vertical tail support struc-
ture loads which were higher than predicted. This required
not only control law changes, but modification to the ver-
tical tail support structure and further horizontal tail
static testing to verify the adequacy of the structures
wit~out reducing aircraft performance. These higher-than-
predicted loads indicated the need for improved structural
design techniques for decoupled motions.
Digital Flight Control System Performance
In the course of 118 test sorties, a total of 38 in-
flight fault ll.eclarations were annunciated by the digital
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flight control system (table 3). At no time did the system
automatically degrade to eit~er a reconfiguration mode or
the analog independent backup unit. All of these fault dec-
larations occurred during periods of system development and
flying qualities envelope expansion. No anomalies occurred
during dedicated handling qualities evaluation flights.
This performance indicated that, like hardware, a software
envelope can be established in which continued reliable
operation can be expected.
During less than 13 months of flight testing, there were
13 DFCS operational flight program (OFP) software releases
(Fig. 6). These incorporated 129 changes, involving approxi-
mately 12,000 words of computer code.
Human Factors
The AFTI/F-16 program has addressed several new issues
and techniques for improving the pilot's ability not only to
fly but also to manage a fighter weapons system. Among
others were the questions of (1) mechanization of flight
controllers for decoupled motions, (2) improved pilot-
vehicle-interface (PVI) avionics, (3) mission phase switcho-
logy for easy transition between mission tasks, and (4)
introduction of voice-commanded switch actuations.
A fair handling qualities evaluation of decoupled
motions demands that flight controllers be mechanized to be
intuitive and to maximize positive transfer of previously
learned skills. Use of the rudder pedals for control of
directional decoupled motions was successful. Indeed, by
the end of the flight test progrnm, pilots found themselves
unconsciously applying flat turns in the bombing task when
it was not required to meet the objectives of the test
maneuver.
This transfer was not as successful, however, with the
throttle twist controller for vertical decoupled motions.
The problem was compounded in that, unlike the rudder
pedals, conventional control on the pitch stick could not be
replaced with decoupled motion and retain gross maneuvering
capability. The result was implementation of two control-
lers that provided simultaneous control in similar (vertical
and/or pitch) axes. Recognizing that the decoupled motions
controlled on the throttle twist were designed for small
vernier corrections, vertical decoupled motions were eva-
luated with the pilot consciously attempting to make small,
high-£requency corrections using the throttle twist control-
ler, while attempting to make larger amplitude, lower fre-
quency corrections using the conventional sidestick. The
results were discouraging in that pilots encountered diffi-
culty in recognizing approaching saturation of left-hand
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decoupled motions and integrating the saturation away with
the right hand. There was also some indication that right-
handed pilots tended to use their left hand less actively
for high-gain tracking corrections than did the left-handed
pilot (one of the five project pilots was left-handed). It
was concluded that the use of two controllers in similar
axes for the same task only increased workload and did not
improve task performance. Each task could be accomplished
just as well (if not better) using only the conventional
sidestick controller.
Improvements in pilot-vehicLe-interface avionics were
beneficial and considered necessary for management of
sophisticated aircraft systems. With multiple complex air-
craft systems, such as multimode flight control systems,
multimode radar, threat warning, and a variety of stores and
stores management options, efficiency in displays and pilot
interface becomes essential for keeping workload at a toler-
able level. Two multipurpose displays (with integrated.
switchology for systems interface) and a conventional
optics, wide-field-of-view (instantaneous 15° x 20° (total
25°) for AFTI/F-16, versus go x 13° (total 20°)) for pro-
duction F-16) head-up display provided that interface capa-
bility. Of particular benefit was the capability to display
flight control system fault status. Although mechanization
and display symbology warranted improvement, the pilot was
offered detailed information on the "health" of the digital
flight control system.
The transition between types of mission (such as from
air combat to ground attack) was made very handily through
mission phase switchology. Through a single switch action,
the pilot could configure all the avionics systems and the
flight control laws for the mission phase. This was con-
sidered very beneficial since configuration of individual
subsystems \vas cumbersome.
The AFTI/F-16 program included the first developmental
testing of a voice command system on a fighter aircraft.
The system was flown on 87 test sorties and was tested by
five pilots. Two independent contractors provided voice
processors for flight testing. The objectives of the
testing were to determine how word recognition rate was
affected by (1) cockpit noise levels and (2) physiological
stress produced by increased g loads. Of 4137 word recogni-
tion attempts, 2615 were tests of varying noise conditions,
1161 were tests of varying load factor conditions, and 361
were in the active mode where pilots activated switchology
by voice during mission tasks. These data were used to
develop system recognition algorithms throughout the test
program.
Varying cockpit noise levels were produced by changes in
airspeed and altitude conditions and environmental control
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system settings (fig. 7). Tests were conducted at normal
load factors from I to 5. All quantitative tests were con-
ducted with the pilot looking forward in the cockpit with no
planned additional cockpit tasking. The systems were tested
mainly in the verify mode where no actual cockpit switch
actions were taken as a result of a recognized word.
Test results are presented in figures 8 and 9. The
overall recognition rate was 78 percent. These figures
include all the data collected during flight tests. There-
fore, they do not delineate improvements made in recognition
algorithms and improvements in recognition rates as pilots
became more familiar with the system. Results indicated
that recognition rates were essentially independent of cock-
pit noise levels and that there was only minor degradation
with load factors up to 5. Brief qualitative evaluations of
voice command systems indicated potential for workload
reduction by use of voice command systems in fighter
cockpits.
DESIGN IMPLICATIONS
Degraded Flight Control
The AFTI/F-16 architecture reflects at least four design
ramifications of general interest. The first issue examines
transition between flight control mode. Highly augmented
aircraft such as the F-16 rely on flight control system
"intelligence" to inhibit aircraft responses. Indeed, the
flight envelopes of all recent fighters are limited by their
flight control systems. Unstable aircraft obviously require
closed-loop feedback control to provide conventional stabi-
lity and control. Increasing dependence on the flight
control system to provide air-craft performance and safety
requires classical tradeoff decisions when the system is
mechanized with digital computers.
Traditionally, software engineers have argued for
simplicity in the generic software failure recovery mechani-
zation. The IBU of the AFTI/F-16 aircraft generally follows
guidelines for simplicity. In fact, the IBU was originally
conceived with no pitch-rate feedback in the longitudinal
axis. Even though the AFTl/F-16 aircraft is slightly
unstable longitudinally, it was initially believed to be
more important to Keep the IBU simple than to minimize pilot
control tasks. The emphasis on simplicity was generally
motivated by the desire to maximize lBU reliability by mini-
mizing complexity as well as the cost of covering a remote
failure mode. The augmentation required by aircraft like
the AFTI/F-16 encourages reexamination of the benefit of
simple, degraded flight control modes such as the IBU.
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The AFTI/F-l6 aircraft requires angle-of-attack limiting
to prevent post-departure deep stall. Simulation suggests
that the lBU reduced capability to recover from spins or
deep stalls. The automatic yaw-rate limiting of the primary
flight control system renders the AFTl/F-l6 extremely spin
resistant. In the IBU, however, the simulation indicates
that stopping yaw rate requires considerable altitude, thus
suggesting a smaller envelope may be necessary for safe air-
craft operation should the aircraft degrade to IBU. A simi-
lar constraint has been encountered with the IBO at high
airspeed. During aeroservoelastic testing, one pilot found
insufficient lateral stability in IBU at Mach 1.2: there-
fore, he reselected the standard normal mode and recommended
not flying faster. Even though the AFTl/F-16 aircraft is
longitudinally stable supersonically, selecting a single
fixed gain for fighter aircraft such as the AFTl/F-l6 over
their entire flight envelope may not be possible.
Analytically, there are at least two parts to the solu-
tion of optimum tradeoff between degraded-mode complexity
and envelope-protection capability. First, consider tran-
sitioning from normal to degraded flight control.
Transitions can be characterized by discontinuous step
inputs or outputs. Additionally, the failures that cause
transition are usually assumed to be random. The second
part of degraded-mode flight addresses whether the flight
can be successfully continued or what constraints must be
observed during abort and recovery.
The more difficult decisions occur with respect to tran-
sition flight. Degraded modes in the AFTl/F-16 aircraft
accommodate discontinuous inputs or outputs satisfactorily,
and the techniques are generally known. The assumption that
one could "drop" into lBU at any time, however, presents the
possibility of some adverse events. Transition to lBU while
flying a maximum angle of attack implies an unfortunately
high probability of departure. Similarly, degrading to IBU
at high airspeed suggests that the pilot must attempt to
slow down in an unstable airframe pilot system. Under such
circumstances the costs of simplicity in modes like the lBU
are very high during random transitions to degraded flight
control. Highly augmented aircraft such as the AFTl/F-16
are penalized rather severely by simplicity in modes like
the IBU during the relatively brief transition period.
Development of the IBU reflected several compromises between
simplicity and adequate coverage: Fig. 10 illustrates the
significant increase in complexity of the final design as
compared with the initial design. Degraded-mode simplicity
is not sufficient justification when it prevents flight-
envelope protection during the transition to backup flight
control. After reversion to a backup mode, however, the
lack of envelope limiting during mission abort is much less
costly, because the pilot can be asked to constrain the
aircraft to more benign conditions.
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For the case of AFTI/F-16 aircraft, angle-of-attac~
limiting would be beneficial, particularly during I8U tran-
sition. Similarly, if a single fixed gain is not sufficient
to provide acceptable stability over the entire envelope,
the backup systems shoulli include additional gains.
Morever, the primary system should automatically update the
appropriate backup gains for the current dynamic pressure
conditions of the airplane. This provision would solve sta-
bility problems associated with any fixed-gain system to
which the aircraft can default at any time. It is not
necessarily as important for the backup system to maintain
equivalent envelope protection during mission abort and
recovery. The pilot can be asked to constrain angle of
attack to safe values during abort. Similarly, he can main-
tain airspeeds and altitudes appropriate to a fixed-gain
control mode such as the I8U. It is feasible to postulate
several gains that a pilot could select as he decelerated
and descended to land. The only constraint to maximizing
opportunities for simplifying backup systems during the
recovery phase is that pilot workload or distraction may
prematurely require a minimum level of augmentation during
the abort/recovery phase. The IBU included pitch-rate feed-
back in partial response to cover pilot workload
constraints.
System Complexity
A second architectural characteristic that significantly
affected our experiences reflected the integrated nature of
the system. The AFTI/F-l6 is complex in terms of the number
of system components and the permutations on component con-
figuration. The large number of system configurations and
their extensive interaction produce rather subtle conse-
quences. It is frequently very difficult to explicitly know
or test all the system effects of pilot actions in the real-
time cockpit environment. Several discretes were required
to indicate a specific component problem, and several com-
ponents drove the same discrete. The AFTI/F-l6 employs an
architecture in which a single discrete may indicate
multiple system conditions and, conversely, several discre-
tes are often required to indicate a single system con-
figuration or degradation. The multipurpose displays (MPDs)
are frequently sequential interfaces with the flight control
system, stores, or fire control computers where the pilot's
eventual interaction with the system is a function of a
series of key strokes whose system effects change based on
the "page" displayed on the MPD at the time of option selec-
tion. Frequently, a time history of failure annunciations
is required to accurately identify a specific failed com-
ponent. Although the AFTI/F-l6 system is not stochastic, it
is often no more clearly deterministic at the time one is
trying to anticipate system response to pilot-controllable
options.
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c.
Such a cockpit 4iffers subtly from more traditional
pilot-vehicle interfaces where system discretes are largely
dedicated to single, fixed functions. ~or example, failure
annunciator lights are usually dedicated to single component
condition in ~ore conventional cockpits. In the AFTI/F-16
cockpit, those same lights may be used in combination with
five-digit nu~erical fields on the MPD to indicate a speci-
fic flight control system failure or configuration. The
salient characteristic of a system with such configurational
flexibility is that cause and effect is deduced from a set
of multivalued system displays that both pass information to
the pilot and represent pilot commands to the system.
In the real-time cockpit environment where decisions are
frequently required within a few minutes, it is often prob-
lematical whether the plot has the information, total system
knowledge, or time to analyze and consciously acknowledge
all ramifications of his interaction with the operating
system. The real-time decisionmaking constraints of systems
sush as the AFTI/F-16 can be addressed by increasing the·
dimensions of the pilot-vehicle interface with color presen-
tations, audible tones, and voice actuation of system
discretes. However, the systems still rely on the pilot to
organize the system information, recognize inductive pat-
terns in the system status, and deduce logical cause and
effect relationships. The AFTI/F-16 may provide an early
opportunity to evaluate "expert systems" in the real-time
cockpit environment. A pilot-vehicle interface constructed
around an expert-system architecture avails itself of a fun-
damental symbiosis. Human beings are unmatched pattern
recognizers. Computers, their information structures, and
certain mathematical algorithms have demonstrated equally
peerless capability to search extensive graphs, trees, and
other prestored lists. An expert system in the real-time
cockpit of an aircraft like the AFTI/F-16 promises to use
the strength of both pilot and computer. Not the least
advantage of such a system would be its capability to par-
tition decisions and system information into equivalent
sets. Such partitioning would allow bounded decisions to be
made without knowledge of the total system's response at the
time of decision. Thus, expert systems may be powerful aids
in solving the type of problems faced in the AFTI/F-16 real-
time cockpit.
Simplex Information in Redundant Systems
A third ramification of system design that has proved
interesting is the user's percepton of system reliability.
The design goal of the AFTI/F-16 triple-redundant dual-fail-
operate system required extraordinarily autonomous channels
and a very powerful interchannel switching protocol to allow
degradation to the last good channel. When the consequences
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of asynchronism are summed with this intrasystem autonomy,
the operating flight control system often appears as a
series of partially autonomous components that compete for
air~raft control. Much of the interchannel independence
arises from both unsynchronized interchannel skew and the
requisite intrasystem autonomy of a triplex dual-fail-
operate system.
It is important to distinguish the effects of asynchro-
nism from last-good-channel operation. The AFTI ~-16's
asynchronous interchannel protocol created system states
where single channels drove discretes and displays at the
pilot-vehicle interface. Such simplex information is most
important when it issues from the last good channel.
Asynchronism, however, caused the display of false simplex
channel information while the redundant set was still func-
tional. Such annunciations diminish the perception that the
system is highly reliable because it is composed of multiple
identical channels - all doing the same "thing" - at least
as long as there are no "real" faults in the system.
Unfortunately, the disagreeable impact of this architec-
ture on perceptions of reliability causes difficulty in
measuring the advantages of the capability to degrade to the
last good channel and to operate asynchronously.
Interchannel comparison varies between the extremes of bit-
by-bit comparison and force summing across the power ram of
an actuator. Even though AFTI/F-16 computers do not expli-
citly ascertain whether the other members of the operating
set are performing the same operation, program development,
nonetheless, shows continued localized synchronization.
AFTI/F-l6 channels do not employ dedicated hardware or soft-
ware to communicate states to redundant channels and wait
for acknowledgment; they "synchronize" by increasing
interaction rates, or voting system states, or both.
Interchannel differences are reduced by voting control law
switch states, which control integrators and gains by
interacting sufficiently fast or by exchanging status infor-
mation in a timely fashion. As long as no errors exist,
redundant systems cannot function reliably unless the impli-
cit interchannel comparisons are sufficiently small to
enable the system to behave as identical command paths.
This requirement is independent of which synchronizing
algorithms are used to achieve sufficient interchannel
tracking. Furthermore, those same algorithms should not
enable simplex information at the pilot-vehicle interface
while a redundant set remains .
.n. graphic example of how dramatically the perception of
reliability can suffer from permitting simplex information
at the pilot-vehicle interface while redundant channels
remain occurred during flight test. Although no failure had
occurred, the pilot received messages that two of the chan-
nels had detected each other failed. With each channel in a
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different state, the actuators eventually selected a com-
mand. The pilot was unable to ascertain system configura-
tion. It is important to recognize that the problem is not
that the system failed to provide sufficient aircraft con-
trol. Such inconsistent simplex information erodes users'
perceptions that the redundant system is operating reliably
and will continue to do so in future confusing failures.
In summary, the AFTI/F-l6 incorporates very powerful
simplex channel capabilities to enable the system to degrade
to the last good channel. Although the architecture
retained this feature, reliability requirements, forced
additional localized interchannel tracking by voting system
states and increasing interaction rates. Regardless of
asynchronism, or last-good-channel capability, displaying
single-channel information with no failures in the redundant
system diminishes subjective estimates of total system
reliability. Neither architectural characteristic should
enable single-channel interaction at the pilot vehicle
interface during redundant channel operation.
Single Failure Propagation in Redundant Systems
A fourth issue, which is tangentially related to the
characteristic discussed above, expands the fidelity of the
interface between redundant core elements of the system and
simplex peripheral components such as avionics. The
AFTI/F-l6 aircraft shares common trends in system design
where the critical core elements are replicated in order to
render sufficient reliability. The triplex flight control
computers represent such strategy. A significant develop-
ment to note, however, is that the redundant set of pro-
cessors is embedded in a set of simplex units, such as the
fire control or air data computer. Similarly, although the
stores management computer is partially dual redundant, the
protocol for switching between redundant halves frequently
failed to take advantage of that capability and simplex
failures were propagated.
The interface between the redundant core of the triplex
flight control computers in the AFTI/F-l6 aircraft must be
meticulously delineated, documented, and understood so that
failures in the simplex subset of the system are not une-
quivocably accepted and replicated by the redundant subset
8f the system. The authority and criticality of simplex
inputs to the integarated system are substantial in the
AFTI!F-l6 and will probably increase in the future.
The AFTI!F-16 aircraft experienced a failure in the
stores computer, which exemplifies the subtle but critical
value of the interface between the redundant core and the
simplex (in this case, the duplex that failed to use its
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redundancy) subset of the total ~FTI/F-16 system. Func-
tioning as a bus controller for the bus conveying flight
con~rol mode requests to the flight control mode requests.
In less than 3 min, the AFTI/F-l6 changed flight control
modes more than 800 times! The flight control computers
received control mode change requests from a simplex bus
controller that appeared to function as a random-number
generator. The flight control computer changed control
modes whenever it received an actual mode request. The
unscrutinized replication of a simplex input as critical as
flight control mode lead to a rather dramatic breakdown of
reliability in the redundant subset of the AFTI/F-l6 system.
Analysis of this type of failure suggests that responsi-
bility for assessing the validity of simplex data resides
in the redundant subset, not the generating single-string
component. Generally, the complex fault-detection logic is
already resident in the redundant subset. Although dupli-
cate information will not be available for fault detection,
resonability checks can still be executed on simplex data.
Since failure-detection algorithms typically reside in the
redundant set, it seems consistent to include simplex data
inputs in these kinds of data validity certifications.
The redundant subset responsibilities for operand vali-
dity follow from a second architectural characteristic in
that the level of sophistication in failure-detection
algorithms should be appropriate to the criticality of the
data. Data criticality is defined by system use and
generally cannot be determined prior to system definition.
Frequently, an avionics system is an operational unit and is
not susceptible to modification of the failure-detection
algorithms because the data are to be used in a more criti-
cal function than intended when the unit was fabricated.
Additionally, loading such failure detection in the redun-
dant subset provides the same fault tolerance to hardware
failures that is provided to other replicated processes.
The final point to be made in this context is that test-
ing should especially emphasize the redundant simplex inter-
face. Once signal-string component errors propagate across
the redundant core boundary, their effects become more insid-
ious, because redundancy no longer covers their effects.
Understanding failure propagation behavior across the redun-
dant simplex interface is roughly equivalent to single-point
failure analysis and shares much of its importance.
CONCLUSIONS
The capability for improved mission effectiveness
becomes ever more critical as enemy threat capabilities
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incredse. Improvements can be attained by providing the
pilot with the best flight control laws for the task at
hand. This was demonstrated in the AFTI/F-16 aircraft using
a multimode digital flight control system designed to opti-
mize handling qualities for individual mission tasks. With-
out task-dedicated control law design, the full benefit of
control law tailoring could not have been realized. This
strongly suggests the need for multiple flight control mode
capablity in future mulitrole fighter aircraft.
Direct side force with zero sideslip has been isolated
as a decoupled motion which promises to significantly··
improve air-to-ground mission performance. Its implemen-
tation on conventional rudder pedals, even with limited
authority, can offer pilots a simple, intuitive initiation
to an easier way to solve the directional problem in bombing
and strafing.
As the systems management function becomes a larger por-
tion of the piloting task, improvements must be made in the
management tools. Integrated avionics must include effi-·
cient and comprehensive pilot displays and system controls,
including multiple display units with well integrated
display symbologies and methods for display of head-up
info~mation over a wider field of view.
Voice command systems offer potential for reducing the
pilot's workload with "hands-on" control of a variety of
onboard systems from transducer codes to flight control
modes. Further implementation of onboard synthesized voice
and interactive operation may allow head-out access to cri-
tical info~mation not displayed visually. Carefully con-
ceived voice systems may help to contain increases in
cockpit workload as avionics subsystems become increasingly
complex.
Each of the four design ramifications discussed in this
paper isolates an independent aspect of vehicles such as the
AFTI/F-16. Our experiences have suggested higher penalties
associated with failure to cover transitions to degraded
mode flight. The costs of simplicity for a highly augmented
vehicle are outstripped by costs of aircraft requirements
for envelope limiting during the transition to degraded
flight control. It is more important to provide envelope
protection during transition than to constrain the backup
system to be the simplest system that allows aircraft reco-
very. Aircraft control deteriorates so rapidly with
unstable airframes that the advantages of backup simplicity
are quickly overshadowed by risks of aircraft loss or severe
operational constraints imposed to enable safe transition to
backup.
The complex nature of the AFTI/F-16 cockpit suggests
rather fundamental constraints that may imply architetures
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as radical as admitting expert systems to integrate the
pilot-vehicle interface.
The capability to degrade to the last 000d channel and
asynchronous interchannel tracking suggest the advisability
of suppressing simplex channel information \'/hile a redundant
set remains functional. Just as the actual reliability of
redundant set operation was improved by localized synchroni-
zation, the user's perception of system reliability is
improved by preventing single-channel interaction at the
pilot-vehicle interface during redundant set operation.
The final issue discussed above suggests that regardless
of information source, the redundant subset should logically
be the location of information validity checks. Simplex
error propagation across the redundant simplex interface
should be emphasized during failure modes and effects
testing.
As user's we have been exposed to several interesting
design ramifications that suggest basic constraints that may
be useful for future design efforts.
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Table 1. Task-tailored flight modes, including decoupled
motion (six degrees of freedom).
Normal
Bombs
Standard modes
SNRM
g command
SASE
9 command
Flat turn
Decoupled modes
DNRM
FPME
Vertical translation
Lateral translation
DASB
FPME
Directional lift
Flat turn
Air-to-air guns SAAG
Pitch-rate
command
Flat turn
Air-to-surface guns SASG
Pitch-rate
. command
Flat turn
DAAG
PRt1E
Pitch pointing
Yaw pointing
DASG
PRME
Pitch pointing
Yaw pointing
FPME
PRME
Flightpath maneuver enchancement
Pitch-rate maneuver enchancement
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Table 2. Decoupled Motion with Maximum Control Authorities.
1-g flight, impurities included.
Motion Authority
Flight Conditions
Airspeed Altitude
(KCAS) (ft)
Flat
turn
Direct
lift
Yaw
pointing
Pitch
pointing
Lateral
Vertical
20
Lateral 9 0.90 g
Yaw rate 7.0 Deg
(122.2 Mils/s
Normal 9 -1.7 9
Pitch rate 2.2
Deg/s/38.4 Mils/s
Sideslip 9.0
Deg/157.1 Mils
Yaw rate 9.0
Deg/s/157.1 Mils/s
6.AOA 8.0 Deg
(139.6 Mils)
Pitch rate -4.9
Deg/s/-85.5 Mils
Lateral g 0.95 9
Lateral velocity 38.3
knots
~ormal g -1.10 9
Vertical velocity
-25.1 knots
500
480
440
277
220
240
450
480
400
480
360
10,000
9,500
21,200
20,200
30,500
31,500
21,000
20,500
9,000
20,500
10,200
Table 3. DFSC Inflight fault detection .
._------_._------
38 fault declarations
Hardware
Switch - 17
Other alc systems - 8
Software
Design and mechanization - 10
Unk.nown Cause
Pilot procedures
Deselection of g-bias - 1
2 fault declarations not resetab1e inflight.
r.
Decoupled fI ight control modes
Aircraft attitude decoupled from
f1ightpath vector-six·degree·of·
freedom maneuvering
• Fuselage pointing
• Direct force
• Translation
Direct side force
Fig. 1. Control surfaces producing decoupled motions.
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Direct lift
• Vertical flight path control
at constant angle of attack
Pitch pointing
• Pitch attitude control at
constant flight path angle
Vertical translation
• Vertical velocity control at
constant pitch attitude
V~t:::"'~"""·
a
+-.....-r
a
v 1:-'.......A.,'-
a
Fig. 2. Vertical decoupled motions. Thottle twist
controller.
Direct sideforce (flat turn)
• Directional f1ightpath control
at zero sideslip angle
Yaw pointing (
• Directional altitude control at V~\--.......L..
constant f1ightpath angle ---,-.-
~ v+-+
~ V 4 +
Lateral translation
• Lateral velocity control at
constant yaw attitude
Fig. 3. Directional decoupled motions. Conventional rudder
pedals.
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·······IBU
11I1111I11I SNRM, SAAG, OAAG
---ONRM
1.21.0.6 .8
Mach
.4
• F·16 limits (9g, 25° AOA, etc.)
• Oecoupled operations to 6g
(release pedal for max roll)
• ONRM more restricted
~1II111j1 II}11/11I11I 1I11IIylllilIII 11I111II1§
KCAS ~ I~'" I ~~
f: ~<::s -/:' /r'V I _ SNRM,ONRM ~<::s :: SAAG,
/ : 20° AOA ~ I ~ § OAAG,
I:' (1g) )ba<:s K
/. I ~~ //: :: ~I : ONRM../I § ~
I :
I .:
I :
I.:
.2
50 x 103
o
40
20
30
10
Altitude,
ft
Fig. 4. Flight envelopes for air-to-air modes.
SOx 103
40
30
Altitude,
ft
20
10
o .2 .4 1.0 1.2 1.4
Fig. 5. Flight envelopes for air-to-ground modes.
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Fig. 6. Digital flight control system
software control - software release summary.
Noise levels for flight test conditions.
Environmental Sound
Altitude/Airspeed Control Setting Pressure Level
30K ft 304 KIAS Auto cool 96dBManual hot 100dB
20K ft 374 KIAS Auto cool 99dBManual hot 103dB
10K ft 448 KIAS Auto cool 100dBManual hot 108dB
5K ft 488 KIAS Auto cool 105dBManual hot 110dB
Fig. 7. Voice command system - noise
levels for flight test conditions.
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100
Contractor #1 lJpAI
Contractor #2 0
80
c
~
c 60C)
0
CJ
Q)
...
-c 40Q)
CJ
...
Q)
Q.
20
0
96dB 99dB 100dB 103
Noise levels
105 108dB 110dB
Fig. 8. Voice command system
accuracy for noise condition.
100
in-flight recognition
Contractor #1 III
Contractor #2 0
80
60
Percent
recognition
40
20
o
29 3g
Load factor
4g 5g
Fig. 9. Voice command system - in-flight
recognition accuracy for load factor conditions.
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(a) Original configuration.
Fig. 10. Independent backup unit.
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(b) Final configuration.
Fig. 10 concluded.
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